Abstract

Whereas Ludwig Wittgenstein is known among many metaphysicians for his fervent rejection of metaphysics as a legitimate philosophical enterprise, A.N. Whitehead is often described as the chief exemplification of the systematic and explanatory metaphysician. This fact might explain why little has been written on how these two philosophers approach philosophical problems in which they shared common interest. In this paper I venture to discuss one such problem, which is the fundamental problem of the nature of reality. I investigate the sense in which Wittgenstein and Whitehead reject modern empiricism as a necessary foundation for a viable realism while still affirming the latter. I also consider the implications of their affirmations of realism for the questions of skepticism and the nature of ‘the ordinary’. Considering the particular philosophical orientations of Wittgenstein and Whitehead, it is significant to see how these questions fare in their works and how their affirmations of realism shed light on the still important question of the nature of philosophy.