The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives

Oxford: Oxford University Press (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Examines the nature of cognitive penetrability hypothesis, which holds that our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. Assesses both cognitive penetrability and impenetrability and explores their philosophical consequences.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,991

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Cognitive Penetrability: An Overview.Athanassios Raftopoulos & John Zeimbekis - 2015 - In John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-56.
Attention and Cognitive Penetration.Christopher Mole - 2015 - In John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 218-238.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-05-10

Downloads
4 (#1,641,599)

6 months
3 (#1,045,430)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Athanassios Raftopoulos
University of Cyprus

Citations of this work

Rich or thin?Susanna Siegel & Alex Byrne - 2016 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. New York: Routledge. pp. 59-80.
On perceptual expertise.Dustin Stokes - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (2):241-263.
Imagining the Past of the Present.Mark Windsor - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references