Ramsification and inductive inference

Synthese 187 (2):569-577 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

An argument, different from the Newman objection, against the view that the cognitive content of a theory is exhausted by its Ramsey sentence is reviewed. The crux of the argument is that Ramsification may ruin inductive systematization between theory and observation. The argument also has some implications concerning the issue of underdetermination.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-12-09

Downloads
1,061 (#12,248)

6 months
132 (#28,469)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Panu Raatikainen
Tampere University

References found in this work

A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 1980 - In Yuri Balashov & Alexander Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 211.

View all 36 references / Add more references