Cada qual é o mais distante de si mesmo

Cadernos Nietzsche 44 (2):67-92 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this essay, we would like to question the recovery and inversion of Terence's formula "I am the closest to myself", in Nietzsche's terms: "Jeder ist sich selbst der Fernst (Each one is to himself the farthest)", found in the first paragraph of the Preface to the Genealogy of Morals. Taking into account the context in which it appears, we propose below a commentary of this paragraph alongside an interpretation of this formula. We would like to question the way Nietzsche relates this formula to the difficulty of acquiring self-knowledge, on which the beginning of the Genealogy of Morals insists. Does this sentence according to which "Each one is to himself the farthest" mean that a knowledge of oneself by oneself would be a futile exercise and that others would necessarily know us better than ourselves, such that the detour by otherness would constitute an obligatory passage for self-knowledge? But Nietzsche tells us from the outset that this Delphic ideal has never been achieved because the exercise has never been really attempted in the first place. Is it then that the beginning of the Genealogy of Morals indeed tries to prevent any self-knowledge (because it would be possible to know everything but the self), or, is there not another more interesting way to understand this formula according to which we are the most distant to ourselves? We would like to show two things in this regard: firstly, that Nietzsche does not prohibit self-knowledge here, but invites us to think about it differently; and secondly, that the formula according to which "everyone is the furthest away from himself" can also be understood as an injunction to keep the self always at a distance. The two dimensions are then linked, since we maintain that self-knowledge in the classical sense can and must be positively replaced in Nietzsche by an interpretation of the self, and that this interpretation must never be thought of as an undertaking to grasp the self once and for all, which would amount to reifying it by taking it out of becoming.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,991

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

4. Kant and Nietzsche on Self-Knowledge.Paul Katsafanas - 2015 - In João Constâncio (ed.), Nietzsche and the Problem of Subjectivity. De Gruyter. pp. 110-130.
What is the role of the self in self-deception?Richard Holton - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (1):53-69.
Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception.Hugo Strandberg - 2015 - New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Against Nietzsche’s '''Theory''' of the Drives.Tom Stern - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):121--140.
The tragic as an ethical category.Robert Guay - 2006 - Philosophy and Literature 30 (2):555-561.
Nietzsche, Truth, and the Horror of Existence.Philip J. Kain - 2006 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 23 (1):41 - 58.
Our Knowledge of One Another.R. I. Aaron - 1944 - Philosophy 19 (72):63 - 75.
On the Genealogy of Morals. [REVIEW]O. H. S. - 1968 - Review of Metaphysics 21 (4):755-755.
Self-talk and Self-awareness: On the Nature of the Relation.Alain Morin - 1993 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (3):223-234.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-11-11

Downloads
5 (#1,560,957)

6 months
3 (#1,046,148)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references