Ninian Smart and the Dialectic of Religious Beliefs and Experiences

پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین 11 (2):99-122 (2013)
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Abstract

In recent philosophical analysis of religious experience and discussion on the relation of beliefs and experiences, Ninian Smart is said to be, amongst such other philosophers as Katz and Hick, a maximal constructivist. Distinguishing theistic and non-theistic contexts of experiences, Smart suggests a two poles theory of religious experience, and draws attention to different levels of interpretation. He holds that cultural-religious contexts, including religious beliefs, influence religious experience, but it is not led to fully determine experience. Accordingly, he takes a position between essentialism and maximal constructivism. This position could call minimal constructivism.

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