Judgmental Belief

Filozofska Istrazivanja 39 (1):189-199 (2019)
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Abstract

What is a belief? To answer this question, the reconstruction of belief-formation is attempted. It reveals the intertwining of two dimensions. At the upper end, there is the truth as the objective teleological goal of belief-formation. This goal is based upon a nested hierarchy of mutually supported sub-goals: objective evidence, transglobal reliability, one’s doxastic sensibility, and one’s all-in ultima facie doxastic seeming. The lower end of the hierarchy is subjective and deontic, whereas, in the middle, teleological and deontic elements intermingle. Belief-formation external or descriptive ingredients get disciplined through non-instrumental teleology and deontics. Teleology-deontics intertwining in belief-formation reveals that a belief shares several characteristics with genuine judgment: phenomenological basis, commitment, sensibility and responsibility. Teleology-deontics intertwining also characterises quasi-agentive account of intentionality. Belief, such as it is predominantly forthcoming in epistemology and ethics, provides a reduced version of the genuine judgment, so that it can comply with externalist and descriptivist agenda, doing away with teleology-deontics intertwining. Judgmental belief perspective is revived once as virtue epistemology, and virtue ethics obtain their support through one’s character

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Matjaz Potrc
University of Ljubljana

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