Abstract

My topic is the nature of individuality, at the intersection of metaphysics and biology. My approach in the first half of the thesis is in the spirit of what P. F. Strawson calls "descriptive metaphysics", in that it is an attempt to make explicit the most general features of our "common sense" understanding of individuality. In the second half of the thesis, I look at some issues in the philosophy of biology and Artificial Life. I first offer a defence of the "etiological" account of biological functions, and then turn to the question of the relationship between life and individuality. I argue for a broadly "externalist" conception of biological individuality, in that what something is, i.e., the real kind to which it belongs, is not determined by anything proper to the individual narrowly conceived; we must take into consideration the wider ecological context in which the organism finds itself. I apply the lessons of these later chapters to some problems in Artificial Life, and close with an exploration of the alleged distinction between a simulation and a realisation. I conclude with some speculations about the possibility of genuine computer-based life