Abstract

Respect for persons is invoked in a variety of contexts to express a widely held moral conviction regarding the right and wrong ways of treating persons. Many contemporary discussions in bioethics rely on this principle, though its meaning remains vague. The purpose of this dissertation is to articulate the meaning of respect for persons, develop its bearing on personal and social ethics, and suggest ways in which it applies to issues in bioethics. ;Initially, I distinguish respect for persons from two related notions, human dignity and the sanctity of life, arguing that only respect for persons will ground a coherent moral perspective. In Chapter 2, I provide an explication of the concept of moral personhood, delineate four criteria for this concept, and argue that its application in moral contexts is similar to the application of a concept like "being an artwork." The third chapter consists of an analysis of the meanings of respect and lays out criteria for respecting persons as persons. ;If individuals are committed to respect for persons, their actions will conform to duties and values expressive of that respect. In Chapter 4, I delineate these duties and values, and distinguish the different forms of self-respect ingredient in the process of developing moral autonomy. By identifying the social conditions which either nurture or diminish the development of moral autonomy, I argue in Chapter 5 that a respect for persons ethic will critique social practices and institutions in the light of their effects on the development of self-respect, moral autonomy and mutual respect. ;Finally, in the last chapter, I identify the unique features of a respect for persons ethic by comparing it with utilitarianism. I claim that respect for persons, while most similar to a Kantian ethic in its emphasis on certain agent-centered restrictions, does include a theory of value by which the consequences of actions and practices are to be evaluated