Zombies

A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind (2001)
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Abstract

What Are Zombies? Zombies are stipulated to be creatures that are in some way identical to human beings-and thus, in some sense, indistinguishable from human beings-but which lack consciousness. Zombies are at least behaviorally identical to human beings or other conscious creatures, and they may also be like us in other ways.

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Tom Polger
University of Cincinnati

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