Belief and Will: LOUIS P. POJMAN

Religious Studies 14 (1):1-14 (1978)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is a widely held belief that one can will to believe, disbelieve, and withhold belief concerning propositions. It is sometimes said that we have a duty to believe certain propositions. These theses have had a long and respected history. In one form or another they receive the support of a large number of philosophers and theologians who have written on the relationship of the will to believing. In the New Testament Jesus holds his disciples responsible for their beliefs, reprimands them for doubting, and speaks of the ability to believe as if it were optional. Paul makes it clear that he thinks propositional belief is a necessary condition for salvation. If a man confesses Christ as Lord with his lips and believes in his heart that God has raised him from the dead, he shall be saved . The writer of Hebrews implies that unless we have certain propositional beliefs we cannot please God . In the New Testament most cases of pistis involve more than a propositional attitude. They involve the idea of trust and faithfulness. Nevertheless, a prima facie case for saying that the volitional theses can be found in the New Testament can be made. Forms of volitionalism can be found stated more explicitly in the writings of the early Church, in the writings of Irenaeus, in the Athanasian Creed, and in Augustine. Acquinas describes faith as an act of the intellect moved by the will. Descartes is perhaps the classic example of a volitionalist, holding that if we were not responsible for our beliefs , then God would be - which is tantamount to blasphemy in that it makes God into a deceiver

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,783

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Faith Without Belief?Louis Pojman - 1986 - Faith and Philosophy 3 (2):157-176.
Salvation without belief.Daniel Speak - 2007 - Religious Studies 43 (2):229-236.
Propositional faith: what it is and what it is not.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):357-372.
Religious belief and the will.Louis P. Pojman - 1986 - New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Faith, doubt and belief, or does faith entail belief?Louis Pojman - 2003 - In Richard M. Gale & Alexander R. Pruss (eds.), The Existence of God. Ashgate Pub Limited. pp. 1--15.
Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis?Uriah Kriegel - 2018 - In Alex Gzrankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. pp. 192-213.
Revocable Belief Revision.Hans van Ditmarsch - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (6):1185-1214.
Subjectivity and Religious Belief. [REVIEW]Louis P. Pojman - 1984 - Faith and Philosophy 1 (4):443-447.
Believing and willing.Louis P. Pojman - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (March):37-56.
Dissonant beliefs.Fred Sommers - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):267-274.
Subjectivity and the Objects of Belief.Neil Philip Feit - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Belief and Will.Louis P. Pojman - 1978 - Religious Studies 14 (1):1 - 14.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-05

Downloads
27 (#588,051)

6 months
7 (#425,099)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Louis P. Pojman
PhD: Oxford University

Citations of this work

Belief and Will Revisited.Robert Holyer - 1983 - Dialogue 22 (2):273-290.
Newman and the 'Ethics of Belief'.M. Jamie Ferreira - 1983 - Religious Studies 19 (3):361 - 373.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references