Confirmation bias emerges from an approximation to Bayesian reasoning

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Cognition 245 (C):105693 (2024)
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10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105693

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Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.

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