Abstract

Almost no work has been done on the substance of Kierkegaard's epistemology. I argue, however, that knowledge plays a much more important role in Kierkegaard's thought than has traditionally been appreciated. ;There are two basic types of knowledge, according to Kierkegaard: "objective knowledge" and "subjective knowledge." I argue that both types of knowledge are associated by Kierkegaard with "certainty" and may be defined as justified true mental representation . I also argue, however, that the meaning of 'certainty,' 'justified' and 'true' is derivative of the object of knowledge. That is, I argue that Kierkegaard employs these expressions in both an objective and subjective sense and that the latter sense is not, as it has often been interpreted to be, subjectivist. ;Finally, I argue that an appreciation of the substance of Kierkegaard's epistemology reveals that the charges of irrationalism which have often been made against him, are without foundation