1. introduction

Abstract

In my view, meanings are instructions to construct monadic concepts that can be conjoined with others, given a few thematic relations and an operation of existential closure. For example, ‘red ball’ is understood as—and has the semantic property of being—an instruction to fetch and conjoin two concepts that are linked, respectively, to ‘red’ and ‘ball’. Other expressions are more complex. But to a first approximation, ‘I stabbed it violently with this’ is an instruction to construct and existentially close a six-conjunct concept of the form indicated below; AGENT(E, S) & STAB(E) & BEFORE(E, T) & PATIENT(E, 1) & VIOLENT(E) & INSTRUMENT(E, 2) where ‘S’, ‘T’, ‘1’ and ‘2’ stand for concepts of the relevant speaker, time, and things demonstrated. The verb and adverb correspond directly to conjoinable concepts of events. The pronouns correspond to such concepts via certain relational notions, reflected with the tense, preposition, and grammatical relations that ‘stab’ bears to its subject and object. I have argued elsewhere that this neo-Davidsonian conception of semantics is descriptively adequate, and yet.

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