On Choosing how to Choose

Abstract

A decision theory is self-recommending if, when you ask it which decision theory you should use, it considers itself to be among the permissible options. I show that many alternatives to expected utility theory are not self-recommending, and I argue that this tells against them.

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Richard Pettigrew
University of Bristol

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References found in this work

Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Money-Pump Arguments.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2022 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility.Allan Gibbard & William L. Harper - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. pp. 125-162.
Clever bookies and coherent beliefs.David Christensen - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.

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