Bare functional desire

Analysis 49 (4):162-69 (1989)
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to sound two notes of caution about a beguiling argument for the negative answer: for the Humean view that desires cannot be beliefs, or cognitive states more generally.

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Author Profiles

Philip Pettit
Australian National University
Huw Price
Cambridge University (PhD)

Citations of this work

Desire.Tim Schroeder - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 (6):631-639.
The indifference argument.Nick Zangwill - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):91 - 124.
Motivation in agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.
Theories of content and theories of motivation.Ralph Wedgwood - 1995 - European Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):273-288.

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