Political equality, plural voting, and the leveling down objection

Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (2):122-164 (2022)
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Abstract

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 2, Page 122-164, May 2022. I argue that the consensus view that one must never level down to equality gives rise to a dilemma. This dilemma is best understood by examining two parallel cases of leveling down: one drawn from the economic domain, the other from the political. In the economic case, both egalitarians and non-egalitarians have resisted the idea of leveling down wages to equality. With no incentives for some people to work hard social productivity will likely decline, further lowering people's wages and thus leaving everybody all-things-considered worse off as a result—hence “never level down.” On the other hand, however, the argument against leveling down does not appear to pass muster in the political sphere: denying political equality in the form of “one person, one vote”, for example, by giving a higher share of voting power to people with, say, more education seems straightforwardly objectionable, even if such a voting scheme would improve the outcomes of all people, including those who are ultimately left with fewer votes. Thus, a fundamental tension arises: we can either endorse the widely-affirmed “never-level-down” thesis, which says that sacrificing people's well-being exclusively for the sake of promoting equality can never be the right thing to do, or we can endorse the principle of “one person, one vote.” But we cannot do both. I defend this dilemma against a view I call the compatibility view: roughly, that because OPOV is strictly necessary to advance some weighty, non-egalitarian interest people have, accepting OPOV as a principle of justice is compatible with one's rejection of leveling down.

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Citations of this work

Unjust Equal Relations.Andreas Bengtson - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy.
Doxastic Affirmative Action.Andreas Bengtson & Lauritz Aastrup Munch - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-18.
One Person, One Vote and the Importance of Baseline.Andreas Bengtson - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
Rescuing Justice and Equality.G. A. Cohen (ed.) - 2008 - Harvard University Press.
Against Democracy: New Preface.Jason Brennan - 2016 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
What is the point of equality.Elizabeth Anderson - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):287-337.
Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.

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