Abstract

The paper analyzes the criticism of the notion “nature of things” within the pyrrhonian sceptical tradition. I begin with a brief exposition of two contemporary epistemological approaches that sets up the boundaries of the discussion: normative and descriptive ones. However, this dichotomy is not strict. The notion of “nature of things” implicitly under­lies the discussion, as I argue, as a normative view about the true reality and its formal characteristics. These metaphysical requirements have to be fulfilled in knowledge. This alone demonstrates a tight connection between these disciplines. Pyrrho’s rejection of the nature of things can be interpreted in terms of underdetermination of the world, which allows various interpretations according to the rule “no more” (ou mallon). This principle states that there is no ultimate ground for the individuation of things. This principle had been used before Pyrrho and justifies his denial of the existence of the nature of things, for to every single thing can be ascribed contradictory predicates. They show themselves in a contradictory way. Then, we point out to the breakdown in the Pyrrhonian tradition and the fact that the notion of nature of things was borrowed and used as a pillar of the revived Pyrrhonism (esp. in Sextus Empiricus). He used this term referring to the unchangeable, invariable and eternal constitution of things. Sextus differs from Pyrrho on by his suspension of judgement about the existence of the nature of things. Al­though Sextus developed an epistemological critique of ancient theories of knowledge and did not investigate this notion, it was pivotal for him to reach the suspension of judgement. It allowed him not to assert any statement as corresponding to or revealing the properties of things by nature. As a result, Pyrrhonian usage of the notion nature of things provided a persuasive and influential criticism against the normative stance and led to its moderation and pragmatization.