Timothy Williamson on thought experiments – an empirical worry

Balkan Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):179-184 (2012)
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Abstract

The topic of this paper is Timothy Williamson’s understanding of the logical form of thought experiments as involving counterfactual conditionals which are true when their antecedent is impossible. At the same time, he sees the ability to handle counterfactuals as grounded in our everyday capacities. The aim of this paper is to drive a wedge, on empirical grounds, between our ordinary capacities and the counterfactuals which require an impossible antecedent.

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Edi Pavlović
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

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