Now or never: How consciousness represents time☆

Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):78-90 (2009)
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Abstract

Consciousness has a peculiar affinity for presence; conscious states represent their contents as now. To understand how conscious states come to represent time in this way, we need a distinction between a mental state that represents now and one that simply occurs now. A teleofunctional theory accounts for the distinction in terms of the development and function of explicit temporal representation. The capacity to represent a situation explicitly as ‘now’ and compare it with past situations in order to prepare for the future involves the separation of goals from the particular action required to attain them. That is, when a creature is able to consider alternative paths of action, it becomes necessary to conceive of alternate future times as distinct from the present moment. The developmental, functional approach of a teleofunctional theory is promising in its ability to integrate research from diverse empirical fields for support of its claims

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Paula Droege
Pennsylvania State University

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