Abstract

The dissertation consists of three chapters on causation. I explore problems with extant reductive analyses and construct alternative accounts in order to develop a better understanding of topics that are of central importance to our understanding of causation, such as the nature of events, the transitivity of the causal relation, the determination of the correct causal relata, and the different kinds of dependence of effects on their causes. ;In the first chapter, I argue that counterfactual analyses, in order to solve the outstanding problem of late preemption, should be amended so as to include as causes of an event those events that make the effect happen at the time it does. In the second, I discuss the transitivity of causation as characterized within covering law and counterfactual analyses, arguing that if we think causation is transitive, we should accept the view that the causal relata are logical parts of events rather than events or facts. I show how covering law and counterfactual analyses can be revised so as to incorporate this view. ;In the third chapter, I discuss the way we use causal claims to assess moral responsibility, and investigate conceptions of causal responsibility through an analysis of the problem of moral luck. I argue that our usual notion of causal responsibility, which includes the assumption that causation is transitive, is not the notion that is necessary for ascriptions of moral responsibility. This amounts to the claim that causal responsibility for an act is not necessary for moral responsibility or that act. I apply the analysis to some well-known moral dilemmas to try and shed light on our moral intuitions in these cases