A defense of epistemic intuitionism

Metaphilosophy 15 (3-4):196-209 (1984)
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2007

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10.1111/j.1467-9973.1984.tb00655.x

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Paul K. Moser
Loyola University, Chicago

Citations of this work

Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem.Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Edited by Jeanne Peijnenburg.
Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?Scott F. Aikin - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191-217.
Infinitism redux? A response to Klein.Carl Gillett - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):709–717.
Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein.Carl Gillett - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):709-717.

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References found in this work

Belief, Truth and Knowledge.D. M. Armstrong - 1973 - London,: Cambridge University Press.
Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1974 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Reasons and knowledge.Marshall Swain - 1981 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?Laurence Bonjour - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):1-14.

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