Vagueness and Omniscience

In Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 89-96 (2015)
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Abstract

We commonly recognize vague predicates when we do not find boundaries to their extension. Would an omniscient being find it equally impossible to establish such boundaries? I will argue that if a semantic theory of vagueness like supervaluationism is correct, we cannot answer the question. The reason is that, under this assumption, cooperative behaviour is not possible for an omniscient being.

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10.1515/9783110418934-010

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Elisa Paganini
Università degli Studi di Milano

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