Abstract

Is the natural world individuated intrinsically, or do we impose all individuation onto nature? Individuative Realism is the thesis that at least some of reality is individuated independently of us, while Anti-Individuative Realism is the thesis that none of reality is individuated independently. I argue that reason is on the side of Anti-Individuative Realism. I do not argue explicitly for the extreme thesis that reality is not individuated intrinsically, but for two more moderate theses. ;In chapter one I argue that understanding the debate requires appreciating overlooked distinctions between kinds of mind-in/dependence---primarily causal, structural and individuative in/dependence. Accepting these distinctions makes it clear that if all reality is individuatively dependent on us then it does not follow that all reality is causally and/or structurally dependent on us as well. This means that a rejection of Individuative Realism is not incompatible with our common sense understanding of the mind/world relationship. ;In chapter two I argue for the moderate thesis that the individual objects and kinds of objects that we recognize in nature are circumscribed by boundaries imposed by us. I make the case by considering several direct proposals for how reality is individuated intrinsically---into natural realities , into natural kinds , and into sub-atomic particles---and showing that upon close inspection each proposed object has exceedingly blurry boundaries. Blurriness of boundaries indicates that the reality is not actually individuated in the way we think it is, and that the boundaries are a function of anthropocentric bias. ;Chapter three considers several indirect proposals in favor of Individuative Realism. The promise of the indirect proposals is that how reality is individuated intrinsically can be determined in virtue of something other than the individual objects/boundaries themselves, such as their being a function of elite properties, explanatory efficacy, or confirmability. I argue that none of these indirect strategies supports Individuative Realism, and further, that no indirect strategy can. This supports my second thesis that even if some of the boundaries we recognize coincide with inherently natural boundaries, we can have no knowledge of the coincidence