Methodological reductionism or methodological dualism? In search of a middle ground

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-14 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

The contrasts between so-called objective and subjective measures of consciousness have been a dominating topic of discussion for decades. The debate has classically been dominated by two positions – that subjective measures may be completely or partially reduced to objective measures, and, alternatively that they must exist in parallel. I argue that many problems relate to subjective reports as they can be imprecise and vulnerable to a number of potential confounding factors. However, I also argue that despite the fact that subjective reports are fallible, all objective measures are derived from subjective measures, and, thus, will never under normal circumstances be more correct. I propose that the best and possibly only realistic way forward is a specific version of a “middle ground”: to attempt to improve subjective reports in a collaboration with objective research methods.

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Morten Overgaard
Aalborg University

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