Disentangling Human Nature from Moral Status: Lessons for and from Philip K. Dick

Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy 6 (2023)
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Abstract

A common interpretation of Philip K. Dick’s texts _Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?_ and _We Can Build You_ is that they attempt to answer the question “What does it mean to be human?” Unfortunately, these interpretations fail to deal with the fact that the term “human” has both metaphysical and moral connotations. Metaphysical meanings associated with theories of human nature and moral meanings associated with theories of moral status are thus blurred in the novels and in the literature that discusses them. This is problematic on many levels. The conclusion argued for in this paper is that we should carefully disentangle these meanings. Doing so has many benefits, both for literary criticism and moral philosophy. For literary criticism, disentanglement helps solve some puzzling elements of the texts that are unlikely to be solved if the entanglements are not undone. Furthermore, disentangling the moral and the metaphysical meanings of “human” provides an opportunity to showcase how theories of moral status can be used as an interpretive lens. For moral philosophy, exploring the entanglements of the novels can suggest new ideas about which non-humans—animals, robots, artificial intelligence—are part of the moral community. Finally, disentangling these meanings highlights problems that arise when one assumes that answers to metaphysical questions entail clear moral answers to questions about moral status.

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James Okapal
Missouri Western State College

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