Abstract

A theory of emotion which stresses the use of emotion concepts to explain actions is developed. An account of action explanation which depends upon Brentano's thesis of the autonomy of the mental realm is given and shown to be consistent with both determinism and physicalism. A proof of the possibility of an autonomous science of the intentional is offered as an answer to Davidson's challenging position of anomalous monism. The use of intentional concepts in explantions of actions framed by a science of the intentional is investigated. A theory of emotions as motives is generated which shows that the concepts of emotions can have a role in such explanations. Two other theories of emotions, behaviourism and sensationalism, which can not account for the use of the concepts of emotions to explain actions are found to be inadaquate. In addition there are other chapters on the objects of emotions, the possibility of unconscious emotions, and the connection between being a person and experiencing certain sorts of emotions which rely on the theory of emotions developed earlier