Death stings back: A reply to Sorensen

Analysis 66 (1):82–92 (2006)
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Abstract

Lucretius argues that death does not harm the person who dies. Harm could occur only if a person’s future non-existence were harmful. But one’s future non-existence is no more harmful than one’s non-existence before birth. Since a person is not harmed by lacking existence before birth, one is not harmed by lacking existence after dying

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Citations of this work

On behalf of spore gods.Alasdair Richmond - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):98-104.

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References found in this work

Philosophical Papers Vol. II.David K. Lewis (ed.) - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Thought experiments.Roy A. Sorensen - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Death.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):73-80.
The Kalam Cosmological Argument.William Lane Craig - 1998 - In Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide. New Brunswick, N.J.: Georgetown Univ Pr. pp. 383-383.
The cheated God: Death and personal time.Roy Sorensen - 2005 - Analysis 65 (2):119–125.

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