Disbelief as the dual of belief

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (3):231 – 252 (2007)
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Abstract

The duality of truth and falsity in a Boolean algebra of propositions is used to generate a duality of belief and disbelief. To each additive probability measure that represents belief there corresponds a dual additive measure that represents disbelief. The dual measure has its own peculiar calculus, in which, for example, measures are added when propositions are combined under conjunction. A Venn diagram of the measure has the contradiction as its total space. While additive measures are not self-dual, the epistemic state of complete ignorance is represented by the unique, monotonic, non-additive measure that is self-dual in its contingent propositions. Convex sets of additive measures fail to represent complete ignorance since they are not self-dual.

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John D. Norton
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

The material theory of induction.John D. Norton - 2021 - Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary Press.
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Ignorance and Indifference.John D. Norton - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (1):45-68.
Cosmic Confusions: Not Supporting versus Supporting Not.John D. Norton - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):501-523.
The Bayesian Who Knew Too Much.Yann Benétreau-Dupin - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1527-1542.

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