Do Ante Rem Mathematical Structures Instantiate Themselves?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):167-177 (2019)
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Abstract

ABSTRACTAnte rem structuralists claim that mathematical objects are places in ante rem structural universals. They also hold that the places in these structural universals instantiate themselves. This paper is an investigation of this self-instantiation thesis. I begin by pointing out that this thesis is of central importance: unless the places of a mathematical structure, such as the places of the natural number structure, themselves instantiate the structure, they cannot have any arithmetical properties. But if places do not have arithmetical properties, then they cannot be the natural numbers. The self-instantiation thesis turns out to be crucial for the identification of mathematical objects with places in structures. Unfortunately, we have no reason to believe that the self-instantiation thesis is true.

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What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
Mathematics as a science of patterns.Michael David Resnik - 1997 - New York ;: Oxford University Press.
Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology.Stewart Shapiro - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):467-475.

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