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Personal pronoun revisionism - asking the right question
Analysis 72 (2):316-318 (2012)
Abstract
Personal pronoun revisionism (so-called by Olson, E. 2007. What are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press) is a response to the problem of the thinking animal on behalf of the neo-Lockean theorist. Many worry about this response. The worry rests on asking the wrong question, namely: how can two thinkers that are so alike differ in this way in their cognitive capacities? This is the wrong question because they don't. The right question is: how can they fail to be the same? From the materialist viewpoint shared by the animalist and neo-Lockean they can't. Personal pronoun revisionism is a consequence of their cognitive identityAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way.Harold W. Noonan - 2021 - Metaphysica 22 (2):263-283.
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