Abstract
Behaviorally assessing residual consciousness of acutely comatose patients involves a high rate of false-negatives. That is, long-term behavioral assessment shows that 41% of vegetative state patients in fact have residual consciousness. Nonetheless, surrogates need to remove ventilation before the acute-phase passes away if they want to induce medico-legal death due to pragmatic factors, such as financial costs. So, surrogate decision-making regarding behaviorally nonresponsive acutely comatose patients involves a moral dilemma: should we ignore the chance that patients have residual consciousness for the sake of pragmatic factors? This paper examines whether neural methods can resolve the moral dilemma. Neural methods are used to assess residual consciousness of behaviorally nonresponsive postcomatose patients. For instance, by instructing a vegetative state patient to imagine wiggling all of her toes, conscious- ness is ascribed if brain activities are localized in the supplementary motor area. Since the most extensive application of neural methods has been in chronic population, it is unclear whether such methods can resolve the moral dilemma. I argue that neural methods also involve a high rate of false-negatives because current tasks of neural methods are structurally misguided. Given the argument, there is no significant difference between behavioral and neural methods regarding the moral dilemma.