Abstract

This dissertation attempts to discern the significance of William James' philosophy of religion and the status of religious beliefs within the context of his thought. The investigation follows two broad approaches. First, it seeks to identify the themes or aspects of James' thoughts that are relevant to questions about the rationality, justification, and truth of religious beliefs. Second, it attempts to show how a synthesis of these themes contributes to the recent effort to chart a fresh course and build a strengthened approach to philosophy of religion. ;The study is divided into five chapters, taking into account the following points: An attempt by James to show that God is a possible object of rational religious belief. The claim that a neutral attitude in cases of "genuine options" is neither rational nor desirable, hence it should be repudiated. The fact that certain subjective factors make it pragmatically desirable and rationally justified to opt for religious beliefs. ;Efforts to demonstrate the core weaknesses of James' arguments show at the same time how a modification of his arguments and an updating of his insight could provide a viable epistemic structure for the justification and/or truth of religious affirmations. ;Drawing upon this reconstruction of James' religious theory, the study indicates how a broad understanding and proper analysis of the phenomenology of religious experience could be combined to establish the epistemic and pragmatic significance of religious beliefs. The dissertation concludes by considering how James' position, especially his view on theism, contributes to the effort to develop a more rigorous approach to the philosophic study of religious phenomena