Abstract

Close analysis of the relevant theories of Russell and Whitehead leads in both cases to the conclusion that a crucial distinction between sensed events and physical events is implicit; if this is so, a bifurcation is also implicit. ;Lastly, the analyses of Russell and Whitehead are brought directly to bear on the special theory of relativity. It is concluded that this theory is still best understood on the dualistic epistemological basis that Einstein recommends. In closing the generalization of this thesis is again urged; namely, that a dualistic epistemology is inherent in deductive sciences, and in normally reflective common sense. ;This essay turns on the work of Albert Einstein. His ideas are first studied from a "positivistic" point of view; that is, on the assumption that nature-as-conceived is somehow reducible to nature-as-perceived. But a closer look at some of his writings indicate that he came to hold a "bifurcation" epistemology; that is, the view that nature-as-perceived must be explained in terms of nature unperceived. It is argued that such a dualistic epistemology is inherent in science, at least since Galileo, and probably inherent in common sense. Einstein's explicit bifurcation-theory is then reviewed, and the special theory of relativity exhibited as a model application thereof. However, Einstein apparently begins from an assumption that enduring objects are the basic substances of the world, while one outcome of the theory of relativity is the suggestion that events play that role. Hence the study turns to Russell and Whitehead; in certain periods both employ an event-ontology, and both seek to avoid "bifurcation."