Abstract
Fictionalists claim that instead of believing certain controversial propositions they accept them nonseriously, as useful make-believe. In this
way they present themselves as having an austere ontology despite the
apparent ontological commitments of their discourse. Some philosophers
object that this plays on a distinction without a difference: the
fictionalist’s would-be nonserious acceptance is the most we can do
for the relevant content acceptance-wise, hence such acceptance is no
different from what we ordinarily call ‘belief’ and should be so called.
They conclude that it is subject to the norms applicable to paradigmatic
empirical beliefs, and hence, pace fictionalists, ontological commitments
must be taken seriously. I disentangle three strands in the objector’s
thought: the ‘What more can you ask for?’ intuition, a linguistic/
conceptual claim, and a claim about norms. I argue that the former
two are compatible with ontological deflationism, and therefore do not
entail applicability of the norms. Nevertheless, if indeed there is no
more robust acceptance with which to contrast the supposed nonserious
acceptance, then the fictionalist’s claim to austere ontology must
be abandoned. Is there a reason to suppose there is any merit to the
distinction-without-a-difference charge? I argue that there is, clarify it,
and defend against objections, focusing on Daly 2008.