Tertiary consciousness

Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (2):141-176 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Direct awareness, or the immediate, on-the-spot, noninferential access that we have to some of our mental-occurrence instances, is a kind of "secondary consciousness." It often happens, in addition, that direct awareness itself is conscious, meaning that one is also directly aware of being so aware. This is "tertiary consciousness." Indeed, absent tertiary consciousness, one could not base actions on what is mentally occurring to one now. Although Armstrong held that "subliminal introspection" suffices for purposive mental activity, tertiary consciousness would seem to be necessary for carrying out such activity because purposive mental activity essentially involves choosing what mentally to do next on the basis of "introspective" feedback. One must be aware of whatever it may be that one is basing one’s actions on. Adopting, in place of "subliminal introspection," either one of two Jamesian hypotheses could save Armstrong from having to posit nonconscious purposive mental activities

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,261

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Consciousness: Varieties of intrinsic theory.Thomas Natsoulas - 1993 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (2):107-32.
What is consciousness?David M. Armstrong - 1981 - In John Heil (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Cornell University Press.
Unconscious sensations.Lynn Stephens - 1988 - Topoi 7 (1):5-10.
Mental States, Conscious and Nonconscious.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (6):392-401.
Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Epistemic consciousness.Neil Manson - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):425-441.
Nonphenomenal consciousness.Eric Lormand - 1996 - Noûs 30 (2):242-61.
The nature of mind.David M. Armstrong - 1970 - In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
Introspection and Consciousness.Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) - 2012 - , US: Oxford University Press.
Shades of consciousness.Roderic A. Girle - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (2):143-57.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references