Toward an improved understanding of Sigmund Freud's conception of consciousness

Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (2):171-92 (1992)
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Abstract

This article seeks to render Sigmund Freud's unfamiliar conception of consciousness more evident and accessible; because Freud was the greatest theorist psychology has so far known, and because present-day psychologists stand in special need of a variety of conceptual frameworks in whose terms they can give coherent and cogent expression to their different hypotheses pertaining to consciousness. The three main sections respectively address Freud's complex property of intrinsic consciousness, which characterizes each instance of every conscious psychical process and includes qualitative content, direct awareness, and tertiary consciousness; the cognitive contents of purportedly pure, or contentless, emotions and feelings; and certain limits and variations of Freud's intrinsic consciousness. A special effort is made to be faithful to Freud's own conception of consciousness; though the discussion includes clarification, explication, and extension of parts of his conception that are undeveloped, summarily stated, or implicit. In fact, Freud's conception of consciousness is treated here as something very much alive today. Implications are drawn and developed that Freud probably never thought of. However, note that the conception presented does not belong to the author of this article. Rather, I present here Sigmund Freud's own conception of consciousness as he might have developed it judging from the part of it that he did express

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In Defense of the What-It-Is-Likeness of Experience.Greg Janzen - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):271-293.
An Adverbialist–Objectualist Account of Pain.Greg Janzen - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):859-876.

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