Ontological subjectivity

Journal of Mind and Behavior 175 (2):175-200 (1991)
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Abstract

Addressed here are certain relations among intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity which Searle has lately been calling our attention, while arguing that certain brain-occurrences possess irreducibly subjective features - in the sense that no amount of strictly objective, third-person information about the animal and his or her brain and behavior could result in a description of any such features, except by inference based on the first-person perspective. In his relevant discussions, Searle has focused on the aspectual shapes of conscious mental brain-occurrences, that is, the particular intrinsic feature of any mental occurrence responsible for the mental occurrence's being of or as of something beyond itself. However, Searle's view would seem, undesirably, to conceive of aspectual shape as purely appearential, in the same sense as a hallucinated fire-breathing dragon is purely appearential. Has not Searle thus abandoned ontological subjectivity - though he has available other ways to conceive of the undoubtedly, as he says, plain fact about biological evolution which is ontological subjectivity? Throughout the present article, Freud's conception of consciousness serves as an aid to understanding Searle's views of subjectivity, consciousness, and intentionality

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Citations of this work

The concept of consciousness4 the reflective meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (4):373–400.
The concept of consciousness: The reflective meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (4):373-400.

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