Notion of Identification: A Philosophical Case Study

Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija 24 (2):128-136 (2016)
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Abstract

Human life should be good life in the real world which is not merely a function of objective facts but also a function of subjective factors like hopes, fears, interests, etc. Goodness, or excellence, is an ethical notion. The factors of good life cannot be identified solely by using the so-called factual (descriptive) methods of identification. This means that the identification cannot be fully “objective” or fully “public”. Furthermore, there is a need for other methods of identification that also take into account certain “subjective” aspects of the object of identification. Following Jaakko Hintikka we call these methods contextual (perspectival) methods of identification. Here ethics is not a set of ethical rules but rather the practical study of human life. How should we live our unique life? A philosophical-conceptual study is thus practical for this purpose. This is what Aristotle called practical wisdom (phronēsis).

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