On Counterfactual Propositions

History and Theory 9:14-38 (1969)
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Abstract

Many historians and philosophers of history hold that no counterfactual. can be given any degree of credibility, and it is true that counterfactuals cannot be logically refuted or confirmed. Yet if everything which is not definitely true is defined as a "fiction," very little is left in human discourse. While certain knowledge is preferable to highly credible knowledge, philosophic speculation suggests that knowledge is at best highly credible. And even though there are no formal methods of handling counterfactuals which would ensure standard results, we do have sound empirical propositions to back up counterfactuals. Counterfactuals have already been used with reasonable degrees of credibility in the areas of policy models, the analysis of consumer surplus, and the analysis of costs and benefits. If history is to go beyond description, counterfactuals must be employed, for without them it would be impossible to, appraise actions and their consequences

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