Abstract

This excellent work defends the radical nature of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology from those who want to turn it into a kind of realism. The influence of such "revisionists" "is so strong at present that the historical Husserl threatens to vanish from sight completely". Husserl, de Boer insists, eventually defined consciousness as absolute being which constitutes the world within itself. "Husserl’s entire development becomes incomprehensible when this idealism is denied". According to de Boer, Franz Brentano convinced the young Husserl that the aim of philosophy was to find a way of anchoring norms in the face of relativism and historicism. Brentano sought to use scientific methodology to found a descriptive psychology which could in turn form the basis for normative sciences. Like Brentano, Husserl was taken with the idea of developing a "rigorous science" of consciousness which would help provide rational a priori values in the face of the irrational world-views so prevalent in the first part of the century. Husserl’s turn away from his early empiricism and naturalism and his eventual adoption of transcendental idealism follows from his attempt to solve three problems in Brentano’s work: 1) the relation between things in themselves and the immanent intentional object; 2) the method for founding a priori truths; 3) the naturalistic attitude inherent in Brentano’s view that positivistic-genetic psychology and phenomenological psychology have equal value in the study of consciousness. Husserl solved the second problem with the notion of the intuition of essences. He solved the first and third problems with the discovery of transcendental idealism in 1908. De Boer maintains that the denial of the thing in itself, which is still presupposed in the naturalistic standpoint operating in Logische Untersuchungen, "is the most important step of all in Husserl’s development". The notion of the thing in itself is common to the naturalistic-dogmatic belief that on the one hand there is a realm of objects independent of consciousness and that on the other hand there is consciousness which has some experience of those objects. In LU, Husserl simply suspended the question of the relation of the thing in itself to consciousness because he still regarded the latter as a kind of island within the "real" world, to which natural science alone has direct access. Despite the fact that LU rejected the naturalizing of ideas, LU continued to regard consciousness in a naturalistic way. Only the "Copernican revolution" of transcendental idealism enabled Husserl to see that the foundation of all being is absolute mind or consciousness. Because consciousness "constitutes" reality in a creative and productive sense, there is no point in speaking of a "thing in itself." Husserl’s transcendental reduction does not deny "reality," but merely rejects the naturalistic tendency to absolutize it.