Statutes of Limitations and Personal Identity

In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume Two. New York, NY, USA: pp. 243-269 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Legal theorists have proposed several theories to justify statutes of limitations in the criminal law, but none of these normative theories is generally accepted. This chapter investigates the related descriptive question as to whether ordinary people have the intuition that legal punishment becomes less appropriate as time passes from the date of the offense and, if they do, what factors play a role in these intuitions. Five studies demonstrate that there is an intuitive statute of limitations on both legal punishment and moral criticism, and that these intuitions arise, in part, from judgments about changes in psychological connectedness over time.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Limiting Identity in Criminal Law.Mihailis E. Diamantis - 2019 - Boston College Law Review 60:2011-2099.
Corporate Essence and Identity in Criminal Law.Mihailis E. Diamantis - 2018 - Journal of Business Ethics 154 (4):955-966.
The elusive object of punishment.Gabriel S. Mendlow - 2019 - Legal Theory 25 (2):105-131.
Personal Identity.David Shoemaker & Kevin P. Tobia - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
A sense of identity: Prolegomena to a social theory of personal identity.John D. GreenwooD - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (1):25–46.
European criminal law and European identity.Mireille Hildebrandt - 2007 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (1):57-78.
Readings in the Philosophy of Law.John Arthur & William H. Shaw (eds.) - 1993 - Pearson Prentice Hall.
Punishment and Community: The Reintegrative Theory of Punishment.Eric Reitan - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):57 - 81.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-05-22

Downloads
471 (#40,372)

6 months
110 (#38,644)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christian Mott
Columbia University

Citations of this work

Personal Identity.David Shoemaker & Kevin P. Tobia - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
Forgiveness, Repentance, and Diachronic Blameworthiness.Andrew C. Khoury - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):700-720.
The Subscript View: A Distinct View of Distinct Selves.Hannah Tierney - 2020 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), The Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 126-323.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The essential moral self.Nina Strohminger & Shaun Nichols - 2014 - Cognition 131 (1):159-171.
Synchronic and Diachronic Responsibility.Andrew C. Khoury - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):735-752.

View all 7 references / Add more references