Abstract

This paper is more than a plea for Rhees’ reading of the work of Wittgenstein (particularly of On Certainty). My interest in Rhees’ interpretation lies on its resemblance with my own reading, on the one hand, and on its being (surprisingly) unmentioned by other interpreters, on the other. The two core aims of this paper focus on Rhees’ main ideas. First, I argue that although certain facts that are accepted beyond doubt belong to the method, which in turn is included in grammar, this does not mean that these facts are expressions of rules of grammar. Second, I argue that grammar is not conditioned by a certain class of facts (i.e. general facts of nature), but a language-game is possible because we do not call in question certain facts (i.e. grammar is not conditioned by something like ontology). The point is that those facts that are not called in question are beyond truth and falsity, but this does not mean that these facts must be true. The logical role these facts (and the sentences used to express them) play in a language-game is not that of being true or false. Moreover, grammar itself constitutes what is meant by ‘object’, ‘fact’, or ‘general fact of nature’.