Abstract

In this paper I discuss two recent readings of Kant’s schematism that are productive for my take on performativity. The first stems from Sibylle Krämer’s Figuration, Anschauung, Erkenntnis from 2016, in which Krämer examines Kant’s writings on schematism, while taking a special look at the notion of figurality. Krämer is keen on describing that intuitions and concepts are dissimilar, and the schema is required to make them similar. The transcendental schema or schematization, Krämer underlines, is a method or act. It is not an image but figurality, and in Kant it is temporal figurality, which acts as a hinge providing homogeneity between concepts and intuitions and thereby making intuitions into something that the categories can latch onto. The second reading of the schematism I discuss is outlined in Maja Soboleva’s Das Denken des Denkens from 2016. Soboleva’s reading is monist and realist, claiming that the understanding does not judge in its primary activity but “shows” in its ability to make rules; it mimics an object for the human understanding. Intuition is crucial for thinking, since we are presented with a system of images, a sphere of semantically undetermined objects that we then judge in a concept. Finally, I conclude with my own reading of Kant’s schematism in outlining two kinds of imagination – one that imagines (Einbildungskraft) the connection in the intelligible realm and the other that emagines (Ausbildungskraft) the connection in the sensible realm. This is how in experience we take in with the senses and subsume under the concepts after concepts have been ordered or prefigured through this double schematization, which effects that intuitions and concepts are the same.