Abstract

We recognise certain acts as ‘sexual assault’, ‘sexual violence’, or a ‘sexual offence’, often to offer strong moral condemnation or to prescribe legal sanction. A common feature of these attacks is that they impose nonconsensual sexual contact; they are sexual attacks. While there has been extensive discussion of consent to sexual contact and of the conditions under which consensual contact is sexual, there has been little investigation into what it is for nonconsensual contact to be sexual. The purpose of this article is to examine the conditions under which an attack (nonconsensual contact) is sexual. I first argue that an account of sexual attacks is important, not least because the question has pressing moral and legal implications. I then consider and reject three accounts, one appealing solely to intuitions, one appealing to the body parts involved, and one appealing to the assailant’s mental state. Finally, I develop my own account. I propose that an attack is sexual if and only if it carries a sexual expressive significance, and thereby conveys a sexual meaning.