Abstract

In this thesis an attempt is made to ground the moral point of view in a theory of well-being. The argument begins with a critique of some contemporary efforts to show that the question 'Why be moral?' is a pseudo-question when it is interpreted as 'Why should I adopt the moral point of view?' Previous efforts to justify morality are then shown to be inadequate due to the failure of their proponents to come fully to grips with the question 'Why be moral?' and the nature of the rational amoralist. The question 'Why should I adopt the moral point of view?', then, is shown to be a legitimate question when asked by a rational amoralist, a question still awaiting an answer. ;It is claimed that the most appropriate and fruitful perspective from which to approach the question 'Why should I adopt the moral point of view?' is an existential perspective. Such a perspective, based upon the work of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre, and focussing on selfhood, is developed in Chapter Two. There the necessary and sufficient conditions of selfhood are described, and the way in which selves may be developed is discussed in accordance with the theme of selves as relations of possibility and necessity. The two primary modes of selfhood, viz., authenticity and inauthenticity, are also discussed. ;In Chapter Three four types of rational amoralist are described and then analyzed on the basis of the existential perspective developed in Chapter Two. These amoralists are shown to be inauthentic, despairing selves who each have, therefore, a motivating reason for making the choice of authenticity. It is then claimed that, given the necessary conditions of selfhood, one who chooses authenticity, i.e., chooses to become himself, thereby chooses to develop close, reciprocal relations with others. These close, reciprocal relations are shown to be moral relations. The rational amoralist, then, is one who, as inauthentic and despairing, has a motivating reason for choosing himself and, thus, has a motivating reason for choosing to adopt the moral point of view. The implications of this justification of the moral point of view for moral theory are indicated in the concluding remarks