Abstract

This thesis concerns the link between Reason and revolutionary praxis in the theories of Herbert Marcuse and Jurgen Habermas. The theories of Marcuse and Habermas are chosen for comparison regarding the role of Reason in revolution because the two seem to be in fundamental theoretical conflict. On the one hand, Marcuse embraces a transcendent concept of Reason, and on the other, Habermas employs an immanent concept of Reason. It is the argument of this thesis that each figure's concept of Reason ultimately determines his theoretical praxis of change. Chapter Two is concerned with Marcuse's and Habermas's reconstructions of the theory of historical materialism as a theory of revolution. This chapter determines the foundations and fonn of each figure's concept of Reason. Here, the analysis is made of the essential differences between Marcuse's concept of transcendent Reason and Habermas's idea of immanent Reason in terms of their reformulations of historical materialism. Chapter Three will examine the impediments to revolution in capitalist society. Here, the dynamic factors which undermine the emergence of Reason and reproduce 'unreason' for both theories are identified. Chapter Four discusses the potential sources of revolution that can be extrapolated from the theories. This chapter is concerned with the 'birth of rebellious subjectivity', that is, the areas of society where Reason can emerge in a revolutionary subject. In Chapter Five, I conclude that there are limitations and problems for both theories in their accounts of revolutionary praxis which stem from each theorist's concept of Reason. Moreover, it is argued that these limitations result from the fact that both theorists place the concept of Reason so centrally in their formulations of political praxis. The conclusion reached is that the concept of Reason itself fails to provide the basis for genuine emancipatory change. It is suggested that Reason can still have a place in the theory of revolution, but instead of determining the shape of and limits to emancipation, it must assume a more narrowly circumscribed role in a partnership with other concepts equally central to human life.