The good and the true

New York: Oxford University Press (1992)
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Abstract

This book provides a radical alternative to naturalistic theories of content, and offers a new conception of the place of mind in the world. Confronting the scientific conception of the nature of reality that has dominated the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, Morris presents a detailed analysis of content and propositional attitudes based on the idea that truth is a value. He rejects the causal theory of the explanation of behavior and replaces it with an alternative that depends upon a rich conception of the behavior we explain with references to state of mind. His lucid and detailed exposition of this controversial arguments poses an emphatic challenge to the naturalistic orthodoxy in areas as diverse as metaphysics, ethics, and cognitive science.

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Author's Profile

Mike Morris
University of Delaware (PhD)

Citations of this work

The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
What is the Normativity of Meaning?Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):219-238.
Normativism defended.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 85--102.

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References found in this work

Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Making mind matter more.Jerry A. Fodor - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (11):59-79.
On saying that.Donald Davidson - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):130-146.
The Semantic Conception of Truth.Alfred Tarski - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.

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