Abstract

Some ancient theologians, such as Pseudo-Dionysius, claim that God is ineffable. This claim is blatantly self-refuting; if true it would entail its own falsity. Rather than being a reason to dismiss such theologians, we should see this as a puzzle to be explored: why do smart philosophers make blatantly self-refuting claims? ;I explore three strands of ancient thought that employ blatantly self-refuting claims: Pseudo-Dionysius, Sextus Empiricus, and the Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita Sutra, or Asta. I argue that all three should be seen as examples of apophasis, in the sense explored by Michael Sells; all three use a process of saying and unsaying claims as a part of their overall projects. 1 review recent thought on ineffability, and find the suggestion that mystics who make claims of ineffability might be using an alternate "mystical" logic of some kind. I survey some contemporary "exotic" logics which might offer some insights into "mystical" logic, especially non-monotonic logic, paraconsistent logic and dialectical logic. ;Based on close textual reading of Pseudo-Dionysius, the Asta, and Sextus Empiricus, I argue that all three should be interpreted as heterodox logicians, employing an informal version of non-monotonic logic. Further, I argue that, in a non-monotonic logic, self-refuting claims have a defensible use. A claim can sometimes refute itself and also successfully refute other claims in a non-monotonic logic. As Sextus says, a self-refuting claim is like an emetic drug, it leads one to vomit it back up, but also leads one to vomit forth any other poisons in the stomach. Self-refuting claims such as claims of ineffability unsay themselves, but can help unsay other claims as well. In the end, I suggest that apophasis may be a very general strategy for dealing with philosophical problems of limits by transgressing limits, but in a non-final way, by stepping over the line but then stepping back