A case for philosophical pluralism: The problem of intentionality

In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 19-32 (1996)
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Abstract

In what sense can we speak of pluralism regarding the philosophical traditions or styles crudely characterised as ‘Continental’ and ‘Analytic’? Do these traditions address the same philosophical problems in different ways, or pose different problems altogether? What, if anything, do these traditions share?

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Dermot Moran
Boston College

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