Heidegger on the Nature of Thinking

Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder (1982)
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Abstract

Heidegger distinguishes between a thinking which is conceptual or representative and is ruled over by methodological considerations, and a more essential 'meditative thinking' which dwells upon Being-itself. The former arises out of the forgetfulness of Being which began with Socrates and Plato, and has developed as the Western intellectual tradition into the science and technology of today. For Heidegger, limiting ourselves to this style of thinking which understands truth as correspondence between concept and object, is placing that which is essential in everything, including man, in danger. Heidegger issues a new call to thinking to return to its pre-metaphysical origins and reclaim its relation with Being-itself. ;Heidegger understands 'thinking' as the conjunction of legein and noein in the presence of Being. 'Thinking' is also essentially related to poiesis , and exists in the same "neighborhood," under the 'appropriation' of Being as 'Saying.' Thinking and poetry are both an 'essential saying' wherein what is, is established. According to Heidegger, nothing comes into being without the 'word' that 'names' it, which is spoken by Being to the ear of Man in the silence of meditative listening. Thus, Heidegger wishes to draw us into an experience with language which will allow us to encounter its true nature and source as the fount of all that is. Heidegger's 'thinking' is a "waiting and listening" to the speaking of Being as language. Heidegger is calling us to this as a recollection of the original nature of 'thinking,' and to mark the danger of the direction of modern times as the loss of the presence of Being. He sees hope in our turning again to reveal this presence, and to protect it wherever we can before we lose all track of it

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